Globalization: Think Of It Like NASCAR Part Six

Hi there! If you're just joining us, you might want to go back and read hubs one through five to bring you up to speed. Over the course of those hubs you will find my arguments fleshed out along with documentation of my references. But I'll review a little here. But if you'd like to start at the beginning, here's part one.

http://wingedcentaur.hubpages.com/hub/Globalization-Think-Of-It-Like-NASCAR

A Brief Recap

Welcome to part six of this series on globalization! What I'm trying to do here, broadly, is present a series of essays in which we try to consider the world as a whole, instead of as a bunch of cut off, compartmentalized, non-related situations here and there, that emerge sui generis -- which is the dominant tendency in the discourse on globalization, in the United States (among the mainstream media and other venues) as far as I can tell. I have tried to correct this imbalance by pursuing one of my major themes: There is only one capitalist system, not multiple, separate capitalisms!

There is one capitalist system, which takes on different flavorings depending upon the precise political, social, and cultural conditions of each hosting country -- and as the system is exercised between nation-states, the precise power relationship between those countries of the capitalist center and those of the 'periphery.' The example I've been using is China.

We have a tendency to speak of 'Chinese capitalism' as authoritarian (and therefore not 'free market-style) capitalism. But the form capitalist development takes in China is merely a reflection of the power relationship -- even now -- between the United States and other capitalist powers at the core and China, which, even now, is still a very poor developing country (in need of foreign investment), largely an assembly platform. In other words, capitalist development is only the way it is, in China, because it is reacting to the demands of American, European, Canadian, and Japanese corporations and their investors, backed by Western state power.

I speculated that our situation, historically, could not have been very different in the United States throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the early part of the twentieth century, when we, the United States, needed foreign investment -- when we had such conditions like: plantation slavery in the south, debt peonage, and Jim Crow after that; child labor (i.e., ten year olds working in the coal mines), and 'sweat shop' labor for women in the garment sector. And so on and so forth.

Why did we have such arduous, dangerous working conditions for the most vulnerable members of our society?

It must have been for the same reason American and Western firms 'offshore' production abroad to countries of the 'developing world': You save a whole lot on labor costs that way; and that means a fatter payday for corporate executives and investors! These practices, it seems to me, were a way to wring every last farthing of value out of the 'American' investments.

I mentioned that, as the power of the United States grew over the course of the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth century, (and I'm speculating here), there must have been waves of nationalizations of European firms -- making them into American concerns. I said this because of the way the arc of American economic history looks to me. It seems to me that as the power and wealth of the United States grew (and the American authorities got more and more control over 'our' economy), the American system could then afford to grant liberties: like ending child labor, women's work in sweat shops, and even slavery.

I use the NASCAR analogy to express the relationship of the core capitalist centers to the so-called periphery. The Western capitalist powers, in my opinion, do not want the developing world to become capitalist nations, in what I have called the free and self-directed sense. The leading world economic powers prefer a relationship of race car driver to pit crew (core capitalist powers to developing nations, respectively). We talked about why I think that is: excess competition drives down profits!

Let's move on

I talked about what I saw as the significance of the post-World War Two Bretton Woods convention: It was an attempt to devise a plan for the safe practice of capitalism among the European powers. It was, essentially, militarized capitalism, as I see it, that caused both world disasters, World Wars One and Two. Also, as I mentioned, when the Great Depression (a worldwide downturn) the European nations tried to get out of it by waging a price war, basically, devaluing their currency.

Therefore, one of the most important things to come out of Bretton Woods was fixed currency exchange rates (what I called financial disarmament). As I said, it seems to me, that, in order for this new understanding to work, the third world had to be tame and under control, as a guaranteed zone of export for the overproduction of European and American capitalist systems (capitalism frequently goes into overproduction, as you know). If I'm losing you, may I suggest, again, that you go back and at least read hubs four and five, before continuing with this one?

The third world also had to be nominally democratic. For this new understanding to work, it would be best if the old European colonial structures were dismantled. After all, it was precisely these relatively clunky structures of specific, territorial European intercontinental hegemonies, and the 'turf battles,' which resulted from them, which had brought the world to the edge of annihilation on two occasions in the space of a quarter of a century. Did I lose you again? Once more, let me say, that if you are just joining us, and especially if you're not familiar with the material I'm covering as well as some of the political theory I'm working with, this hub will probably be extremely hard to follow. You might decide that life is too short, and abandon the enterprise. Believe me, I completely understand! This is only a recap, as I said, so I'm movng briskly along so I can come to the topic: the case histories of how Poland and South Africa have been impacted by what they call 'globalization.' As I mentioned, you should probably at least read hubs four and five before going on with this one. So, if you'd like to do that.... here's part four.

http://wingedcentaur.hubpages.com/hub/Globalization-Think-Of-It-Like-NASCAR-Part-Four

Now then, even as the third world needed to become at least nominally democratic and decolonized -- it could not become so democratic so as to preclude their use as guaranteed buyers of American-Western-Japanese surplus product, including fighter jets and other weapon systems. Those regions of the Earth needed to be politically reliable, cheap sources of natural resources and 'flexible' labor markets, and virtually regulation-free zones of industry and speculative finance capital movement.

And so, as I said before, a vital understanding that the architects of Bretton Woods sought to put across, as I see it, was the idea that in the new world of capital accumulation that was being designed there was 'enough for everybody.' Therefore, the third world had to be available as a safety valve to relieve the inevitable pressures that capitalism brings about for the European and North American capitalist powers (dumping ground for overproduction, source of cheap labor, markets of last resort, etc).

Globalization for whom?

When I use the word 'globalization,' I am referring to the specific way that the United States primarily (as the acknowledged leader of the advanced capitalist world since the end of World War Two) organized the rest of the world economically, starting in the 1970s. In order to do that we had to revisit the economic history of the post-1945 period.

In the previous hub I began to talk about the relationship, as I see it, between the financial structure and what economists call the 'real' economy. I asked the reader(s) to think of the economy of a country like a single human body and its financial infrastructure like its metabolism. The job of finance is to make the real economy work better. The relationship of finance to the real economy is that of the metabolism and the rest of the body.

Your metabolism converts food into needed nutrients and the like, and distributes them, throughout your body where they are most needed. The financial system has much the same function in relation to the real economy. Its job is to take your bank account, for example, and invest it in the new pogo stick factory across town. This is what a healthy functioning capitalist economy is supposed to do.

If your metabolism becomes greatly overactive and burns substantially more calories than it takes in, this is not good -- because you are burning fat, then muscle, then bone... then you die of starvation (or anorexia). The over-excitement of the metabolic financial system relative to its 'caloric intake' (that is, available investment in production).

Between 1945 and 1975 the American economy was, relatively, 'in balance,' if you like, as I mentioned before. This period was the golden age of American state capitalism. Not only was the economy producing goods and services for the domestic market, the United States was producing the needed goods and services to help rebuild the war-torn societies of Europe and Japan (and lending those cash-strapped governments the money to buy those goods and services).

During the 1970s (perhaps starting in the late sixties) the level of manufacturing activity declined in the United States, as a share of GDP, as improvements in communications and transport technologies made it desirable and advantageous for business to relocate overseas where wage costs are much lower and social obligations are minimal-to-non-existent.

This process of 'offshoring' of production is also known as deindustrialization. At the very same time as this was going on the world of finance was being deregulated, throwing off its previous New Deal era restrictions. What this means is that as the ability of the metabolic financial system to 'burn calories,' in a sense, or distribute capital was INCREASING dramatically precisely when the 'caloric intake' of the U.S. body-economic, in the form of available areas of productive investment (through deindustrialization), was DECREASING.

Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s the U.S. body-economic was feeling rather calorie-deprived. The American authorities took measures to correct this situation, but the programs only had a temporary effect.

1990

So, by 1990 what we have is a U.S. body-economic which is desperately hungry, ravenous, a wild beast frothing at the mouth, in rabid search for more and more 'calories' (areas of productive investment)

As I already mentioned, something called the Washington Consensus was formerly unveiled in 1989. This consensus was said to represent common sense policies, agreed to across the American political spectrum, and which, therefore, represented the bare minimum conditions an economy must feature to be healthy. It's a tripartite amalgam of: privatization of state assets, deregulation and 'free trade,' and drastic cutbacks to social spending.

Remember, we talking about what they call 'globalization.' We're talking about a U.S. body-economic, that is hungry, for the reasons I've been talking about, ravenous, desperately calorie-deprived, and therefore constanly looking for new sources of 'calories' (productive investment). For this reason I previously likened the 'Washington Consensus' to a siren song.

What is a siren song?

Well, in the Greek myths, sirens are mermaids who sing a sweet song that lures in sailors -- with the promise of paradise..... but since human beings cannot breathe underwater, the song is a song of death, a song luring people to their deaths.

This means that a siren song is a fundamental deception, a lie. The Washington Consensus was the hunting call of a ravenous, half-starved, calorie-deprived American economy, led by an over-energized metabolic financial system.

What I'm trying to say is, that starting in 1990 the severely 'calorie-deprived' American body-economic, led by a tremendously over-energized metabolic financial system (because of all the deregulation), advanced by a different form of U.S. imperial practice known as 'globalization,' became externally predatory in a way that it hadn't been since the 1920s. Incidentally, I think it is no coincidence, therefore, that many commentators have said that the levels of income inequality we have, here, in the United States, are very similar to that of the 1920s before the stock market crash and Great Depression of the 1930s -- because one of the symptoms of that period, as now, was out of control finance, which led into an unsustainable gap between rich and poor.

What we're talking about, here (our contemporary condition), is the rise of finance capitalism. Almost from the beginning of the emergence of capitalism as a mature system in the Western world, this tendency to finance capitalism (financialization) has existed in national capitalist economies; and almost from the beginning this situation has had its critics. There are all kinds of terms. Finance capitalism (financialization) is just what we have been talking about: a situation in which finance becomes somewhat detached from the 'real' economy, and becomes oddly self-perpetuating.

As Chalmers Johnson wrote: "[Adam] Smith and [John] Hobson both believed that finance capitalism produced the pathologies of the global economy they called mercantilism and imperialism: that is, true economic exploitation of others rather than mutually beneficial exchanges among economic actors" (Johnson p.202).

Mercantilism refers to assymmetrical trade relations, engaged in by the leading capitalist powers at the center and those countries at the capitalist periphery -- free trade for you, but protection for me! You'll recall that I said that the U.S. body-economic was feeling rather 'calorie-deprived' in the 1970s and 1980s (due to deindustialization). The American authorities, as I said before, in an attempt to keep the U.S. body-economic from going into complete anorexic meltdown, undertook measures. These included an attempt to 'reindustrialize' America with the Pentagon's 'factory of the future' program and tariff protections against superior Japanese goods (steel, consumer electronics, cameras, etc).

Dr. Joseph E. Stiglitz - former chairman of Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors and chief economist at the World Bank

Professor Stiglitz is an interesting figure, a Keynsian economist at the left end of the mainstream political spectrum, who noted:

"What happened in the Roaring Nineties was that a set of longstanding checks and balances -- a balance between Wall Street, Main Street (or High Street, as it is called in the United Kingdom), and labor, between Old Technology and New Technology, government and the market -- was upset, in some essential ways, by the new ascendancy of Finance. Everyone deferred to its judgments. Countries, including the United States, were told to accept the discipline of the market. Longstanding wisdom that there were alternative policies, that different policies affected different groups differently, that there were trade-offs, that politics provided the arena through which the trade-offs were evaluated and choices were made, was shunted aside" (Stiglitz p.xiv).

Stiglitz talks about the siren song of the Washington Consensus, with its carrot and stick approach.

"Those countries which did not voluntarily mimic America, in the hope that their economy too would experience a boom, including those that thought America had not gotten the balance right, were cajoled, badgered, and in the case of developing countries dependent on assistance from the International Monetary Fund, effectively forced to go along with what was described as the sweep of history" (Stiglitz pp.xv-xvi).

Stiglitz talks about how the United States used the apparent (and I stress the word 'apparent') strength of the American economy, as a demonstration effect, as a lever to get other countries to fall in line, as it were.

"At international meetings, such as the G-7, which brought together the leaders of the advanced countries, we boasted of our success and preached to the sometimes envious economic leaders of other countries that if they would imitate us, they too could enjoy prosperity like our" (Stiglitz p.4).

Furthermore, "[a]sians were told to abandon the model that had seemingly served them so well for two decades, involving lifetime job security -- and had led to new ways of business that we had imitated, such as just-in-time production -- but was now seen to be faltering. Sweden and other adherents to the welfare state appeared to be abandoning their models, as well, by trimming state benefits and lowering tax rates" (ibid).

Pause: Let me say this...

It is easy to confuse apparent vitality and strength with health. Let us return to our metabolism analogy.

Suppose you (whoever 'you' might be) are persisting on four and a half hours of sleep a night, if that, smoking a pack of cigarettes a day, and because of a rushed, hectic schedule you have to maintain, you're getting by on eating cereal, french fries, and snickers bars -- and let's throw in the fact that you're going through an emotionally and financially wrenching divorce (complete with negotiations about child custody and visitation).

But you are not feeling as badly as you should because you are taking large, regular doses of amphetamines (I believe they used to call it 'speed' back in the day). You're body is literally wasting away (its giving far more output than you're getting in terms of good 'fuel,' if you like), but because you are high on 'speed,' you feel like you can jump over this house! Follow me?

I suggest that the American economy was much like this across the 1980s and 1990s. We know that by the mid-1990s manufacturing shrank to close to 14 percent of U.S. total output, and an even smaller share of total world output (Stiglitz p.5). We also know that at the same time the United States became the first leading world economic power to see its real economy surpassed fortyfold in nominal dollar volume by the financial economy (Phillips p.138).

It is generally understood that the prosperity of the eighties and nineties was fuelled by a stock market boom, a 'bull market,' in fact, which ran from 1982 to 2000. What you have is what I called the 'hollowing' out of the economy. Therefore, what powered that stock market boom were investment in essentially 'hollow' activities, as I mentioned before: corporate restructurings, mergers and acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, hostile takeovers, 'flipping' companies, etc. And, of course, there's always the arms sales!

What I'm saying, therefore, is that the economy that made other world leaders so jealous, at those international meetings was an economy hyped up on speed, in effect. The American economy gave the appearance of strength (which it had in a way), yet which was precisely the indicator of its weakness.

Let's revisit the meditations of Dr. Stiglitz.

I think my thesis about the predatory transformation of the U.S. body-economic, in 1990, must come pretty close to the mark, because that is -- as far as I can see -- the only way to explain Dr. Stiglitz's puzzlement over the Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde behavior of the Clinton administration (of which Stiglitz was a member, remember) concerning economic matters. What Stiglitz was saying, in effect, was that Clinton acted like a 'good Democrat,' at home on economic policy, but like a right-wing Republican on international economic policy. But don't take my word for it...

First of all, Stiglitz noted that "[g]lobalization had often not produced the benefits that were promised. Except in Asia -- which had largely not followed the prescriptions for growth and development the United States had put forth -- poverty was up, in some places dramatically so" (Stiglitz p.20). He went on to point out that when Russia was hit with the Washington Consensus, in the 1990s, its GDP declined by 40 percent, and that poverty had increased tenfold (ibid). Indeed, with the lifting of price controls middle class Russians had been reduced to penury, forced to sell personal belongings on the street to earn money for food -- a desperate act that Chicago School economists called 'entrepreneurial' (Klein pp.223, 225).

Stiglitz again: "Clearly, something was amiss in the way we were leading the world into the new international order" (Stiglitz p.21). That 'clearly, something was amiss' part is suggestive, is it not?

I'd like you to keep in mind that these criticisms were coming from someone who had considered himself a Clinton booster, one who was proud of Clinton's record as a whole (at least he did as of 2003, as far as I know, the year his book was published).

Let's proceed.

Stiglitz explained that:

"The international agreements reflected our concerns, our interests: we forced those abroad to open up their capital markets, say, to our derivatives and speculative capital flows, knowing how destabilizing they could be. But Wall Street wanted it, and what Wall Street wanted, it more than likely got" (ibid p.22).

Subsidies

Stiglitz's remarks, I want to emphasize, are not just academic. He was an insider of the Clinton administration -- chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors.

He noted that developing countries were ordered to open up their markets to our goods from our subsidized farmers and agribusinesses, while we denied third world farmers our market (Stiglitz p.22), and we still do, last I heard, costing African farmers a $100 billion a year with our tariffs and subsidies -- the U.S. in conjunction with other advanced capitalist countries (Napoleoni p.195).

Our standard, reflexive advice to countries fallen on hard times, wrote Stiglitz, was to cut spending (which means slash social services spending), even though (as we all know) we, in America, had routinely relied on deficit spending to get us through the rough patches (Stiglitz p.22).

Now we're really getting to it when Stiglitz says: "Especially strange was the contrast between the Clinton administration's palliatives abroad and the battles it waged at home. At home, we defended our public social security against privatization, lauding its low transaction costs, the income security which it provided, how it had virtually eliminated poverty among the elderly. Abroad, we pushed privatization" (ibid).

And...

"At home, we argued strongly that the Fed should keep a focus on growth and unemployment, as well as inflation -- with a president elected on a jobs platform, he could do nothing less" (Stiglitz pp.22-23). "Abroad, we urged central banks to focus exclusively on inflation" (ibid p.23).

Its starting to look like Clinton practiced a kind of social Darwinist, every-country-for-itself kind of predatory economic nationalism, doesn't it? But wait, there's more....

"At home, we resisted pressure for changes in the bankruptcy law that would unduly hurt debtors," wrote Dr. Stiglitz. "Abroad, a primary concern in any foreign crisis seemed the promptest and fullest repayment of debts to American and other Western banks, even to the point of supplying billions of dollars to ensure that happened" (Stiglitz p.24).

Remember, this is the Democratic administration of William Jefferson "I feel your pain" Clinton we're talking about. We're almost done.

Stiglitz went on to symbiotically praise/lament the fact that "[w]e stood for civil and human rights, for a new internationalism, for democracy... The end of the Cold War gave us more freedom to stand for traditional American values -- and we did that... But, again under the influence of finance, abroad we pushed a market fundamentalist set of reforms, in any way we could, paying little attention to how what we did undermined democratic processes" (ibid p.25).

Stiglitz never reached the full implications of his own insider observations. Indeed, he pulled up short and retreated, saying that it was all a dreadful mistake. "Of all the mistakes we made in the Roaring Nineties, the worst were caused by a lack of standing by our principles and a lack of vision" (Stiglitz p.25). Let me just say that I am not the only one whose noticed Joseph Stiglitz's habit of being befuddled at the contradictions between Clinton's domestic and international economic policy (Harvey p.45).

Last word, and I'll close with this...

I mentioned that the American body-economic, led by an over-energized metabolic financial system, thrust into the world by way of a variation on U.S. imperial practice in 1990, known as 'globalization' -- became predatory in a way it hadn't been since the 1920s.

Now, roughly from 1935 to 1965, U.S. policy was under the influence, more or less (and I must stress 'more or less'), of FDR's 'Good Neighbor' policy (aimed specifically at Latin America), which formally renounced America's right to intervene, militarily or any other way, in Latin American politics, and which produced a decade of the greatest period of good will, peace, and cooperation the Western Hemisphere, as a whole, had ever known before or since (Grandin pp.27-49) -- Roosevelt's New Deal policy at home, followed by Truman's Fair Deal and Marshall Plan (with the Bretton Woods convention not to be forgotten) for the rebuilding of the war-torn societies of Western Europe and Japan, and Johnson's Great Society domestic program. By the way, let's remember the overall, strategic purpose of this collection of policies was largely Cold War-motivated, designed to 'prove' the superiority of the Western system over the Eastern Soviet system.

However, from the Johnson administration (1963-1969) on, I would say, a shift in the strategic direction of U.S. policy is detectable. This is the case with Latin America (a region, along with the Caribbean, which the U.S. powers-that-be have always regarded as 'our domain,' going back to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823). Historian Greg Grandin wrote: "It was under Johnson's watch that the United States began to shift the balance of its Latin American diplomacy away from development toward the interests of private capital. Increasingly, economic reform in Latin America meant not industrialization and socially responsible investment but lower tariffs on U.S. exports and lower tax rates on U.S. profits, a policy that would come to full bloom under Ronald Reagan. It was also under Johnson that Washington began either to organize or patronize a cycle of coups -- starting in Brazil in 1964, continuing through Uruguay, Bolivia, and Chile, and ending in Argentina in 1976" (Grandin p.49).

With the Washington administration after Johnson's, Nixon's, the United States took the dollar off the gold standard in 1971, as I mentioned, which effectively dissolved the Bretton Woods agreement -- a curious, dangerous bit of financial REARMAMENT, as I see it.

Now, between 1950 and 1964, the United States either organized or patronized coups or attempted coups in Iran, Guatemala, and South Vietnam (Kinzer pp.117-128, 129-145, 149-169), Indonesia and the Congo (Kinzer p.2), and of course, Cuba under Fidel Castro on more than one occasion leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chafe pp.198-205).

By the way, for anybody who might be interested in my take on, what I think were the real reasons the Kennedy brothers were so interested in Cuba, you might check out my series on the Kennedy assassinations.

http://wingedcentaur.hubpages.com/hub/The-Kennedy-Assassination

Remember, I said that ROUGHLY from 1935 to 1965, U.S. policy was MORE OR LESS under the influence of the Good Neighbor Policy, the New Deal, Fair Deal, Marshall Plan, and Great Society. Nothing is ever one hundred percent, exact in this world.

Anyway, while it is certainly true that material economic interests were at stake, in the intervention the United States participated in between 1950 and 1964 -- I, personally, do not think the motivation of government strategic planners was economic (at least not in the narrow self-interested, national sense); I rather think the motivation for these operations were strategic and geopolitical, if you will.

Remember the position of global dominance of the U.S. economy enjoyed from the end of World War Two to the mid-1970s. The 1950s and 1960s were the so-called 'Golden Age' of American state capitalism. Its not like the United States did much international trade in the 1950s and 1960s. There wasn't really anybody to trade with in the 1950s and 1960s.

Even by 1960 a whopping 4 percent of the cars Americans bought came from outside of the country, and 4 percent of the steel Americans used, and less than 6 percent of the televisions, radios, and other consumer electronics we bought, came from outside (Reich p.43). The American economy was the global juggernaut, and the U.S. authorities must have thought it would always be so.

Furthermore, the U.S. policy of helping rebuild Japan after the war, had been predicated on the assumption -- wrong, as it turned out -- that neither Japan nor any of the other East Asian countries would ever actually become a competitor with the United States (or other Western economies) (Johnson pp.177-178, 182).

Therefore, it seems to me, that the interventions of 1950-1976, need to be understood in terms of the motivation of the United States to maintain the stability of the new, global capitalist order (as they saw it/see it). As I've been saying, in order for there to be peace in Europe -- for once -- these powers had to see that there was 'enough for everybody.' In order for this notion to be true, the United States and the other Western powers had to manage the third world in the very particular way, I've talked about. I have argued that, even more important to the Western powers, than keeping the third world out of the Soviet orbit -- was, paradoxically, keeping third world nations from developing into CAPITALIST countries, that would add UNWANTED ADDITIONAL COMPETITION to the advanced capitalist centers of North American and Western European commerce. After all, once again let me say, it had been INTER-CAPITALIST COMPETITION between the European nations that had brought about THE TWO GREAT GLOBAL CATASTROPHES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, NAMELY WORLD WARS ONE AND TWO! Therefore, U.S. policy makers probably would have (still do, I expect) seen themselves (see themselves) as being very pragmatic.

Okay, I'll leave it there. I'm sorry, I know I was supposed to talk about Poland and South Africa. This hub is way too long already. I will discuss Poland and South Africa in part seven, using Naomi Klein's work. As a compensation, I'll also throw in a word about what happened to Russia when it was hit with the Washington Consensus in the 1990s; and we'll see how that series of circumstances actually adversely affected Israeli-Palestinian relations. Stay tuned!

References

Johnson, Chalmers. BlowBack: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. Metropolitan Books, 2000. pp.177-178, 182, 202

Stiglitz, Joseph E. The Roaring Nineties: A New History Of The World's Most Prosperous Decade. W.W. Norton & Company, 2003. pp.xiv-xvi, 4-5, 20-25

Phillips, Kevin. Wealth and Democracy: A Political History of the American Rich. Broadway Books, 2002. p.138

Klein, Naomi. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Metropolitan Books (Henry Holt & Company), 2007. pp.223, 225

Napoleoni, Loretta. Rogue Economics. Seven Stories Press, 2008. p.195

Harvey, David. The Enigma of Capital And The Crises of Capitalism. Oxford University Press, 2010. p.45

Grandin, Greg. Empire's Workshop: Latin America, The United States, And The Rise Of The New Imperialism. Metropolitan Books (Henry Holt & Company), 2006. pp.27-49

Kinzer, Stephen. OverThrow: America's Century Of Regime Change From Hawaii To Iraq. Henry Holt & Company, 2006. pp.2, 117-128, 129-145, 149-169

Chafe, William H. The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II. Oxford University Press, 1995. pp.198-205

Reich, Robert B. Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life. Alfred A Knopf, 2007. p.43

Thank you for reading. And now let us take our musical exterlude....

And now part seven.

http://wingedcentaur.hubpages.com/hub/Globalization-Think-Of-It-Like-NASCAR-Part-Seven